The Genial Gene

Controversy is good for selling books, and Joan Roughgarden’s “The Genial Gene”  is already on my list – but good to see this dampener from New Scientist. Good because it’s the story I’ve been peddling for quite some time.

After all, most behavioural ecologists admit that it is sometimes in an individual’s best interest to cooperate with its neighbours and mates. And certainly all, probably even Roughgarden, would agree that there are times when competition is the order of the day. If the debate comes down to a question of how often and under what conditions, Roughgarden’s new theory is likely to end up an important extension to existing thought, and not a revolutionary departure from it. Appropriately, Roughgarden and her critics are likely to have more to gain from cooperation than from conflict.

Laurie Taylor interviews Eagleton

Thanks to Sam for this link to this Terry Eagleton interview by Laurie Taylor in the New Humanist. Pretty sure I have this original link to Eagleton’s review of The God Delusion, but just in case.

Great interview anyway. Several points to pick-up on …

the inevitability of progress

Eagleton referring to Dawkins beliefs. The idea that evolution inevitably moves toward greater good – almost a definition of evolution for the Dawkins-style Darwinist. Given that Dawkins coined the selfish-gene / meme idea, that is brutally ignorant of humans. Meme’s can be very bad for our own good. OK so humans are not the be-all and end-all of progress, by any measure, but can we already simply be redundant hosts ? I think not.

his own contradictions are worn with pride as symbols of ineffable profundity

PZ Myers quote about Eagleton. If we could just unpick that pejorative “worn with pride” phrasing, I would have to identify with that myself. Contradiction is a matter of perspective, the profundity is only ineffable if you are static in your viewpoint.

(Also some good stuff on being dismissive of PoMo’s and PoPoMo’s – Foucault, Derrida, Lacan … wonder where he joins up with Zizek and Sloterdijk ? Also some good stuff on a certain – non-blind-faith – kind of certainty. Fits my reading of Harris.)

[Post Note – interesting blog from William Crawley – which also inlcudes a link to this Salon review by Andrew O’Hehir.]

Radical Empiricism – Working Understanding

Two pre-amble points.

Firstly, in a way, arriving at a “working understanding”, as opposed to a “definition”, is part of what radical empiricism is about. Going directly from phenomena experienced to definion is too intellectual too quick and misses out the radical empiricism itself.

Secondly, the term “radical” is easy to misuse. Dave Buchanan accused me of misunderstanding the term as used in radical empiricism (and he was right too) some time ago – but in fact we do need to be concern with two different meanings. Radical, as in outside established norms, reactionary to received wisdom … is relevant. Mentioned this aspect recently when looking at Zizek and Sloterdijk – some ideas only make sense in that non-socialized –  original “Kynic” – context. Interestingly Matt Kundert made this same point about James and his radical empiricism at the time – being radical in this counter-culture sense.

But this is just preamble. What of radical in the radical empiricist sense … radical as in fundamentally significant. What follows is my own rewording of an exchange between Matt, Dave and myelf from several months ago …. a snippet of conversation that has sat in my draft posts folder for quite some time.

This was my conclusion:

Radical Empricism takes the idea of empricism so far back from conceptualized models of the world as to take it back beyond even any preconceptualized, atomistic (greedy reductionist) view of the world as objects. A kind of “total” empiricism, (immediate or pre-conceptual) purged of any vestige of pre-conception. It is taking the preconceptions of objectification out of experience (out of both the senses of experience and the phenomena experienced).

What follows is the original mail snippets. (The water / river metaphor is a good one … used elsewhere,)

Ian – I’ve been trying to get an understanding of what radical empricism really is, beyond what I already understand by empricism, post-Dewey-James-Pirsig-Rorty. Thanks for picking this up Matt.

Ian – I actually think I agree more with DMB than you here in the end, but the point is I believe we have converged on an understanding (for me) of what “radical empiricism” is.

Matt-  James’s sense was that the relations between things (atoms) were as directly experienced as anything else, and this old thought of his, as > DMB said, eventually turned into his doctrine of radical empiricism.

Ian – Right, so if you don’t hold a reductionist / atomist view of the word to start with then (obviously) “relations are as directly experienced as anything else” …. we are still simply talking about what is experienced. (Turning anything into a doctrine sounds the potentially scary bit … the politics …) So beyond that simple statement what actually is “radical empiricism” …. ?

Matt – DMB is also right to suppose that thought of James’s is in line with what I called panrelationalism.  Atomism is when you think experiences, or perceptions, or language can be broken down into little non-breakdownable nuggets (qualia, sensa, words, etc.), and these nuggets are the real part of the bigger thing, and the bigger thing only works when it stretches back to these little things.  Opposed to this is holism, and James wanted to be a holist about experience, which is where his “stream of consciousness” metaphor comes from.

Ian – exactly. Whether we talk in “streams of consciousness” terms or not, I see that holistic view (non-reductionist / atomist view) of experience and what is experienced.

Matt – Experience isn’t sifting through a bunch of rocks, its more like water, which can be dipped into and separated from the river, but it all kinda’ depends on what kind of bucket you are using (a way of saying things are relative to purpose, a pragmatist master concept).

Matt – My entire so-called problem with radical empiricism is really just a problem with using the direct/indirect distinction at all at this level of conversation about experience (or language or whatever).  For the traditional empiricist, the senses are the direct part.  But James wants to toss that.  But then, what’s left to be direct?  I don’t believe DMB answered your question directly: are the first five [senses] also what a pragmatist considers direct experience?  The radical empiricist has to answer no, but once you’ve let thoughts into the area, what are we throwing up in the way so that something becomes indirect?  In the atomist picture, life is like a dude in a quarry, picking through reality-rocks, and when you aren’t in touch with the rocks, you’re not with reality (hence, the correspondence theory of truth).  But on James’s metaphor, life is like being in a river, and when you’re in a river, you’re never not in contact with the river.

Ian – Actually I have no problem with that metaphor … when you are in a river you experience the water and its motion etc. You are not experiencing “a river”, not without some pre-conceptual (pre-experienced) idea of a river as a whole collection of water with a lifecycle, beginning and end, non-salinity, bounded by river-banks, and some emergent identity as a river from all of that – you do not get that from the direct / immediate experience alone – just the water and its motion (it’s all process anyway).

Ian – If that’s what “radical empricism” is. I have no problem with it. It is taking the preconceptions of objectification out of experience (out of BOTH the senses of experience and the phenomena experienced).

Matt – I recently said, in a post to Bo, that Pirsig’s empiricist rhetoric can get in the way.  I don’t take this as a strike against radical empiricism, though, because I take holism to be the centerpiece (and the Quality thesis to be intrinsically holist).

Ian – An empricism that recognizes the holism in what is experienced before the holism in the concepts arising sounds right. When you say “holistic” where I might say “strange loopy” … this is just a choice of language. Language gets in the way of successful discourse about these subjects, hence the need to repeat, recycle the debate in different words. But it doesn’t get in the way of this direct-experience / conceptualized distinction. Not for me now anyway. All seems clear.

Ian – Radical Empricism takes the “doctrine” of empricism so far back from conceptualized models of the world as to take it back beyond even any preconceptualized, atomistic (greedy reductionist) view of the world as objects. A kind of “total” empiricism, purged of any vestige of pre-conception. I’d like to think I’m there. (It’s been obvious from Pirsig readings all along … just a matter of finding the words.)

Matt – A radical revolutionary isn’t an official part of the political system–they are in the business of overturning the political system. And just so with James’s radical empiricism.

Ian – I just know from prior experience that DMB is going to say that is misuse of the term “radical” here. (and I agree with him) Perhaps I missed your irony Matt, you old Rortian you 😉

Ian – The $64,000 question is how does this change the “values” and PoV’s in the applied world of pragmatism. I guess it stops us falling into a few more conceptual traps, avoiding applying our day-to-day logic to mis-conceived objects more thoroughly.

Dumb Atheists

I like to think of myself as (I’ve even been branded) a “sophisticated atheist” and, as an “open-minded scientist”, I’ve been a fan for several years of  Brian Josephson; staunch Nodel-laureate defender against bad knee-jerk science.

Feb 2009 article here from Brian, about the case last year where Michael Reiss (a Theist) came to “step down” from his position as director of education for The Royal Society after making a speech at the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

Interesting that what Reiss said was perfectly reasonable, yet atheistic fundamentalists (including Harry Kroto) succeeded in making his position impossible. Doubly interesting : a “brownie point” for arch-atheist Dawkins as a reasonable voice on the side of good sense in this case. And after posing some tough questions to The Royal Society, how about this for a conclusion ?

I think it very likely that … those attacking religion per se will be proved wrong by science.
Brian Josephson.