David Harding is a long-standing member of the Pirsig community who has recently posted on his blog:
Power Thrives on Rigid Labels. Democracy Thrives on Values.
How an amoral metaphysics enables social power to influence shared cultural dialogue in an untold number of ways. Thankfully there’s a solution.
His focus here is explicitly the labels<>values contrast, and I have some questions to ask about his use of labels, but first I need to affirm my agreement with the central point in his sub-heading. The world runs predominantly on the subject-object metaphysics he calls amoral and he correctly emphasises the “cultural” dimension of how our real-world dialogues are deeply influenced by it and why its amoral influence enables any number of immoral interpretations and uses by those with power to act. The solution he alludes to is Robert Pirsig’s metaphysics of quality. No argument from me, being values-based, morality is built into Pirsig’s MoQ.
Labels Generally? I use a concept I refer to as #GoodFences. The idea that the names we give things – labels – are a necessary component of any constructive dialogue. But, however much formal, logical, objective – and contractual / legal – discourse depends on such labels and things being “well-defined”, in the real world they are best treated as good fences. Linguistic this-not-that dividing lines between the objects of our dialogue necessary for the purpose of having the dialogue but nevertheless movable and evolvable as part of that dialogue. Not rigidly cast in stone, except in artificially constrained contexts. Since subject-object metaphysics is predicated on those labelled things it unsurprisingly relies entirely on their definitions. So again, no argument, fixed rigid labels are bad for real world dialogue.
Labels Specifically? We need to look at the words David uses:
His starting topic is the idea of “socialism” in US political discourse – most associated with Bernie Sanders. Those scare quotes suggest #GoodFences to me, that we’re avoiding rigid definitions, and yet to have any meaningful dialogue, we clearly need to distinguish socialism from the alternative(s). Capitalism and Social-Democracy (he says “democratic socialism”).
He suggests Bernie and his supporters wear the socialist label with pride – necessary when your binary-partisan opponents are labelling you with it pejoratively anyway. I would however suggest most of us using such a short-hand label in intelligent good-faith dialogue are intending social-democracy not literally “social-ism”?
However either term includes the “social” root and David uses this to bring-up the relation to the social level in Pirsig’s MoQ. I would question whether Pirsig’s use of social is the same as understood in general real-world usage and political dialogue? And, either way, whether people favour capitalism over socialism or vice-versa, or any “mixed” version of the two, anyone that discounts the democratic element has a whole different set of questions to answer. [Aside – in my own “Psybernetic” researches and writings, I’ve long and regularly concluded all roads from Cybernetics (ie Governance) lead to Democracy and the systems we envisage to implement it. Most recently here. And, more comprehensively here, updating left and right with freedoms on economic and social axes, etc.]
Assuming for the moment we can equate or otherwise reconcile Pirsig’s use of social with more general usage of the word, then this claim holds:
“that label [socialism] quietly smuggles in: not care, not fairness, but an acceptance of social-level power concentrating under the cover of higher intellectual or moral authority. Cries that capitalism’s immorality can only be solved through socialism or communism are common, but they miss the deeper problem entirely”
“The issue isn’t capitalism as such – it’s what values control culture, and who and what gets to enforce them.”
Elite(s)? At this point he introduces elite(s), proceeds to use the word many more times, and, since he lays the blame at their / our door, socialist or capitalist, I need to understand what he means by elite? If I get myself elected to a position of temporary delegated power, do I become a member of an elite? If I consider I hold an intellectual understanding of Pirsig’s social and intellectual levels, do I get labelled a member of an elite? In Pirsigian terms what does it mean to refer to “an intellectual class” as an elite?
This one question aside, David nevertheless makes plenty of important true statements:
“Left unchecked, capitalism doesn’t just respond to Dynamic Quality – it converts social power into permanence, allowing those who win early or win big to shape the rules in their favour. Capitalism alone, then, is no more virtuous than socialism alone. Both become immoral when they’re absolutised.”
“From an MOQ perspective, democracy’s moral strength is precisely this openness. It does not freeze value at the social or intellectual level. Instead, it creates the conditions under which better ideas, better arrangements, and better values can emerge over time. When democracy fails, it is usually because this Dynamic function has been undermined, not because democracy itself was the problem.
Towards the end he concludes:
“Because despite everything, people still do share remarkably similar underlying values: meaningful work, security, distrust of elites, and a genuine voice in shaping their future. What is fractured: is not the culture itself, but the language and metaphysics people are given to understand it.”
That includes “elites” as the bad guys again, so in order to agree I’d need to read that as a bad kind of elites, rather than elites per se? Help me. That last sentence is also somewhat tautologous to me in the sense that it is the prevailing culture that gives us those shared understandings?
And in the final paragraph:
“[The MoQ] keeps evolutionary conflicts of morality at the front of mind whilst [common folks] evaluate elite suggestions. And the key here is that with this better metaphysics they can uniquely do so in the intellectual language of the elites.”
More of the us and them in there again – common folks vs elites – so understanding the use of “elite” is crucial to understanding, without it becoming simply another “rigid label”?
Overall worth a read, and I’d be interested in how others read it, Pirsigians or otherwise.
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Comment from Dennis via Email:
“Clearly there are ..elites…in every field….sport being the most obvious and similarly in various cultural areas …..problem arises when such recognition is extended beyond narrow area of expertise or performance to wider areas such as politics for example
Also there are issues where status is passed on from one generation to another or to a wider extended family….this can be seen most commonly in politics but even in popular music…..of course our children do tend to inherit advantage from our own social standing and may extend into educational opportunities etc
Nominally Socialist societies paradoxically seem especially prone to this as leaders who gained their position on merit often want to pass on leadership positions to their own families…..in some cases this is reinforced by tradition as in the case of Royal families…and may have some merit where their role is merely ceremonial.”
Thanks Dennis – Yes, that’s kinda my point – and a long-standing question I’ve had with David.
He’s really talking about a bad kind of elite, or elites with bad properties.
Conversely there are necessary elites with good/useful properties.
I’m just trying to get him to elaborate on that.
As you know, I’m not a fan of Pirsig’s politics, at least as expressed in ZMM. But Harding makes an interesting point: “The issue isn’t capitalism as such – it’s what values control culture, and who and what gets to enforce them. ” As it happens, I’m working on a post with a similar theme. But what goes for capitalism and socialism goes for all systematizations of the values that control culture. That includes even the Enlightenment, or what Pirsig calls “the Church of Reason.” As he says somewhere in ZMM (I’m quoting from my own blog post of long ago):
“The Church of Reason, like all institutions of the System, is based not on individual strength but upon individual weakness. What’s really demanded in the Church of Reason is not ability, but inability. Then you are considered teachable. A truly able person is always a threat. . . to see it (Quality) one has to be free from social authority, and this (the Church of Reason) is an institution of social authority.”
Harding’s answer to the problem seems to be a form of anarchism (necessarily vague in outline). This is in accord with the libertarianism that runs through ZMM. But make no mistake, this libertarianism is elitist to the core. As I commented, “The message is well-hidden, more in the tone than the content. It manifests as a sort of rugged American individualism, but also an emotional appeal to the reader to join a club of superior people. For this, the loud, aggressive motorcycle, the braggadocio, the contempt for others, the narcissistic emotions, the strength in the face of hardship, act reflexively as inducements to a certain type of person, who may just have been saved thereby from following Ayn Rand. The book appeals uncritically to the American mythology of revolutionary exceptionalism, and everything is interpreted within that context.”
In calling for the end of system, Harding is not alone; on the contrary, he joins a postmodern movement that includes thinkers like Paul Feyerabend, Jean-François Lyotard, and Donna Haraway (just some people I happen to have been reading lately). This movement identifies systems as the problem, because systems brings with them totalitarian tendencies. The more magnificent the system, the more totalitarian its grip. Therefore the solution is to turn away from systems, or what Harding calls “social-level power,” and towards less structured relationships. It’s a point I’ll make in the post I’m working on now (if I ever get it written).
But the question of practical implementation looms large. Can we just stop having systems, or are they built into the fabric of any way of life we can conceive? I think the latter may be true, and if that’s the case, it’s not about how to escape them, but about how to move freely among them so that they do not become totalitarian When Harding talks about “maintaining a culture capable of evaluating and revising its values over time,” I think he’s addressing this point. But to me that sounds like moving from one quasi-totalitarianism to another over time, while looking for the means to accomplish this. I think we should be asking how we can avoid totalitarian tendencies altogether in the systems we use. Attitudes such as skepticism or irony are sometimes floated as solutions, but we have learned that these tend to be corrosive. A better approach might involve care and earnestness. Harding mentions the word a couple of times. The important thing, though, is not to be too earnest about any given system. There is a balance to be struck between earnestness and irony, between care and don’t-care. After postmodernism, that’s the tightrope we have to walk.
Great contribution there AJ.
You’re right, being against “Systems” or “The System” is a common anarchic position.
Of course my whole agenda is about describing the right enlightened kind(s) of system(s) – “Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking” that properly account for values for which Pirsig provides a great framework IMHO.
And of course “Post Post Modernism” (PoPoMo) is a label I also adopt
Hope David sees and responds to your thoughts 🙂
An important correction: the “Church of Reason” likely refers to the education system , not to the Enlightenment.
I could try to comment at Harding’s site, basically to call his attention to this exchange. Would that be out of line? You see, I’m a socail klutz, and a lesson I’m frequently taught is to be careful about interfering.
Hi AJ – actually we tend to apply Church of Reason to the whole objective, science-based “Aristotelian” enlightenment edifice, not just how it’s taught but how it’s applied through culture.
Harding’s site is a public blog, just like mine. He has been made aware of the dialogue happening here, but there’s nothing to stop you commenting directly on his blog 🙂
If he’s aware of what I’ve said here, I will neither call his attention to it, nor repeat myself on his blog. Maybe I’ll re-read his post and see if I’m inspired to add a comment there. Meanwhile, I’d welcome his response to the comment here, if he feels like making one.
Excellent article, review, and comments. I appreciate the emphasis on values over rigid labels. I agree that freezing identity categories left, right, elite, populist often prevents real dialogue. Power does thrive on hardened labels.
But I would push one step further. The problem is not simply that “elites” control the narrative. The deeper issue is unaccountable concentrations of power. Some people will always hold more knowledge, coordination capacity, or institutional responsibility. That alone does not make them suspect. What matters is whether power remains accountable to shared moral constraints.
From a relational perspective, democracy is not good merely because it is open to Dynamic change. It is good when it preserves shared truth, mutual accountability, participation, and limits on permanence of power. Openness without accountability is precisely what allows capture.
So the question is not whether we abolish “elites,” but whether we prevent any relational node, whether political, corporate, technological, from escaping accountability while claiming moral authority. AJ’s critique sharpens this point. A “quality” frame can drift into an enlightened-versus-the-herd posture, even if unintentionally. And a reflexive suspicion of institutions can resemble anarchism if it lacks a constructive account of governance.
I don’t think David or Pirsig intended that drift. Their aim seems to be better, more responsive governance. Still, it is fair to acknowledge the risk of liberal elitism in some readings of the MoQ. The Rand comparison is clever: ZMM may redirect would-be Randians into a more humane lane than Rand herself, yet AJ detects a lingering “special people” Randian-like psychology beneath it.
AJ raises an important concern. If “revising values over time” simply means whichever group captures the levers gets to redefine morality, then yes, that risks serial quasi-totalitarianism.
The real safeguard is structural, not just attitudinal. The same digital tools that currently amplify concentrated power could be redesigned to increase transparency and accountability and shared input. same topic being discussed at some length separately in the RPA forum.