I’ve had Mark Solms (2021) book “The Hidden Spring – A Journey to the Source of Consciousness” since April last year.
Finding lots of content I recognised (eg. a major dependence on Jaak Panksepp and life as “homeostasis” – the whole book is dedicated to Panksepp in fact), I satisfied myself with maybe never actually reading Solms amidst other priorities. Primarily – the cortical fallacy – a shift of focus away from the “higher” brain cortex to mid-brain / brain-stem sites of conscious activity. At that point McGilchrist’s Master and Emissary was already history and The Matter With Things hadn’t yet materialised. The two are complementary: a higher-vs-mid/lower emphasis as opposed to a left/right-mediated-by-mid/corpus-callosum, and despite the fact neither references the other (?), both share a lot of resources.
Both also share an emphasis of practical experience of not just the physio-neurology but the clinical psycho-analytical / psychiatric aspects of their human subjects too. Both also are to some extent rehabilitating fields that became unfashionable due to too many subjective “snags” in being taken entirely seriously by science (*). In fact Solms has effectively created his own subject area – neuro-psycho-analysis – out of the wreckage of cognitive neuroscience.
I guess I was a little prejudiced against Solms apparent wish to locate a specific site of consciousness physically within the brain, since I already subscribe to a pan-(proto)-psychism. For me the brain – the whole extended nervous and hormonal system – is the transducer and/or orchestrator of our conscious experience, whichever directions we slice and dice the functional elements for analysis. Solms and McGilchrist are clearly both right. It’s the systems architecture that matters, the elements all play their parts.
Anyway, I am now slowly reading Solms and getting plenty from it. As well as the obvious recurring idea – a given – that any science that discounts the subjective from its attempts to explain consciousness is discounting itself from any chance of doing so, Solms has a strong support (after Panksepp) for an ontology of feelings – the qualitative aspects of immediately sensed experience – as literally what constitute conscious experience. Very close to the Pirsigian quality of pre-conceptual, radical empiricism. Obviously Pirsig isn’t referenced, not even in the 2/3 I’ve not yet read, but I will complete it.
Again, still, highly recommended.
(*) eg the jibe of sneering scientific orthodoxy against Oliver Sacks as “the man who mistook his patients for a literary career”.